1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it. 565 178 517

Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in school, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of Kuomintang and Communist leaders shows that the majority of them came from middle-class, land-owning, and merchant families and were graduates of modern schools.[10] The labor unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new careers.

During this period of social and political disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining offices by virtue of their military success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampao) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the 178 701 [874]

10. Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-121.

war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skills, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period. 701 178

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The Chinese Communists interpret the existing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint, and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition from a class society to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes. 565 668

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese Nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy the rights of the People. In the first group were included the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" such as H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

producers' co-operatives. In May 1954, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women held its first Rural Work Meeting and called upon all women on the farms of China to join the movement.[52] The activities of rural women are not limited to the land. In Kiangsi alone, for example, more than 50,000 women belong to the militia.[53]

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In the cities, women are important to the urban inhabitants' committees and the worker's family committees, both Party devices for urban control. Apart from participation in all drives in the cities -- notably the "democratic reform" movement and Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns -- the Federation of Democratic Women also co-operates with the Department of Women Workers of the trade unions. The federation also urges all women, including housewives, to participate in social work.

Party control over women's federations follows the same pattern as that for other mass organizations. The Party as well as the New Democratic Youth Corps maintains a commission on women's affairs. The commission has the power of direction and policy-making. However, the work of the commission is subject to the supervision of other basic departments such as the departments of organization, propaganda,

52. People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 386-87.
53. Yangtze Daily, July 13, 1951, p. 3.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

organized only after the Party had established control over such earlier peasants' organizations as the Poor Peasants' Corps, Peasants' Mass Meeting, and Peasants' Representatives Conference. Further, although plenary meetings were held, the true power of the association lay with the executive committee, which was under Party control.

The militia, an armed force at the disposal of the Party, is an organization of poor peasants, farm laborers, and young people. As of December 1950, the strength of the militia in the Central-South China region was placed at 1,480,000 men.[59] In Hupeh, a membership of 220,000 was reported in September 1950. Prior to May 1950, the militia structure was complex and unwieldy. It was reorganized in May 1950 and more thoroughly, in 1952.[60] According to a January 1952 directive of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee,[61] each village was to have a platoon, each ch'ü forms a company. Its size is in no sense comparable to its military counterpart. Operationally, area commands at all levels can employ the local militia. The People's council, with the approval of the military command

59. Yangtze Daily, Dec. 15, 1950, p. 1; in Hupeh alone, a reported 220,000 men in Sept. 1950; ibid., Sept. 23, 1950, p. 2.

60. Ibid., March 31, 1951, p. 3; for the employment of militia prior to the Party's assumption of power, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1953, p. 3.

61. Ibid., Jan. 5, 1952, p. 1; for a study of militia, see Li Tang, Militia of Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

of the area, can employ the militia for such duties as the transportation of food and the guarding of granaries.

The duties of the milita in peace time are to assist the public security organizations in matters concerning arrests and detention, co-operate with troops in campaigns against bandits, to guard bridges and transportation centers, and to take charge of food transportation and the maintenance of order at public meetings. In war time, the militia's duty is to co-operate with area commands in district defense.

2. Consolidation Period: 1952

As land reform came to a close, Communist power was established but not yet unchallenged in the rural areas. First, many villages and hsiang were controlled by "reactionary" elements[62] who, in some instances, were said to have succeeded in bribing Party members. Such a phenomenon was often reported, and in 1954 ten per cent of the villages in the country as a whole still belonged in this "backward" category.[63] Secondly, the cadres were said to be generally apathetic. For this the Communists gave four reasons: (a) the low educational level of the cadres which made them incapable of successfully completing assigned tasks; (b) the "five-fears" reportedly

62. See chapter on Subversive Potentialities.

63. Yangtze Daily, Aug. 23, 1951, p. 2; of early report, in ibid., Sept. 1, 1950.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF14 Central China AF14

The businessmen do not fare any better. Sale, purchase, sources of supply, and market outlet are regulated and controlled. Government bonds must be purchased, and exorbitant taxation has been imposed. Trapped by restriction and taxation, many businessmen have been forced to abandon their enterprises. The general atmosphere is certainly not conducive to public confidence in the government.

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3. Compulsory Services

The Communist government frequently drafts rural workers for public labor. For major irrigation projects, even farmers in distant areas are mobilized. The Ching River flood control project in Hupeh Province, for example, enlisted almost 200,000 "voluntary workers" from Central-South China.[35] To maintain a militia for emergency services, the government requires the young peasant to receive training in his spare time. When he is formally inducted into the militia, he is assigned to patrol the key centers in the village, guard and help to ship government grain, assist in combatting bandits, and take part in group activities organized for militia members.

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A parallel scheme is instituted for urban residents, requiring them to render certain services in the areas of their residence. They must attend meetings and stand ready to be called for patrol duties. During 1951-53,[36] citizens of Wuhan were ordered to patrol the streets at night.

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35. Yangtze Daily, March 30, 1952, p. 1.

36. Ibid., March 4, 1953, p. 3.

2: Ling & Ruey

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Chart of the position of Table showing the military organization of the Hsien

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p. 162	p. 164

/104 cont./

1405/ it was changed to ch'ang kuan szu, with two city seats, one on the mountain top and another at the foot of the mountain. Today they have been abolished. The old city of the Wu-chai ch'ang kuan szu is the present seat of the T'ing /i.e. Feng-huang sub-prefecture/ administration, but it has been greatly expanded. During the Ming period all was under the jurisdiction of the Pacification Commissioner at Pao-ching."

Kan Ch'eng was opened somewhat later, when at the end of the Hung Wu reign period /1368-98/ a ch'ien hu suo /a ch'ien hu was an official at a military station, in charge of 1,000 soldiers; suo = office or bureau/ was established. The "Shu Wang P'ien" /historical section/ of the Miao Fang Pei Lan states: "In the second month of the thirtieth year of Hung Wu /1397/ there was set up at Chen-ch'i a military and civilian ch'ien hu bureau. Sun Ying-lung, who was then keeper of the records at Lu-ch'i, proclaimed that the tribal people of the upper five tu /hsien subdivisions/ should be divided into ten li /neighborhoods/, to be under the jurisdiction of Ch'en-chou. Ying-lung was promoted by imperial mandate to be in charge of the pacification. He selected the head ch'ien hu in charge of the ch'ien hu bureau at Chien-ch'ang, Kiangsi, to go to the capital to be given a bronze seal and given the hereditary office of ch'ien hu of Chen-ch'i. When the emperor went to the pavilion to send him on his way, he proclaimed: 'I have a single pellet of Miao territory, and I ask you to go ahead to open up headquarters for bringing the barbarians under our administration. Do what is good for them, and your descendants will enjoy the use /of the office/ without limit.' Moreover, he ordered the Board of War to select Ch'en Ya of Wu-sa military station in Kweichow and Sung Kuei of Lu-chou military station in Szechwan to be assistant ch'ien hu to go with him to assist him. He ordered the Board of Civil Office to select a head constable, and the provincial treasurer to allot for district police officers, who were granted, wrapped up an ivory tablet, paper money, and a silver belt, and entertained ceremoniously, and sent on their way. In the fifth

C /104 cont./
175 month Tuan Wen reached Chen-ch'i, established the Military
631 Station Office, and inaugurated the system, dividing 124 native
563 villages into ten li, making Yang Erh, the main leader, a
M pe fu ch'ang /head of hundred men/. The other 132 villages
*175 /105/ became a local army 'to protect the city moats.' When
631 there were uprisings then they would be called to service; when
*648 conditions were peaceful then they would disperse as civilians.
C Hence the name, Military and Civilian Office" Chen-ch'i then
[701] is modern Suo-li, which is 20 li northeast of Kan-ch'eng hsien's main city.

Yung-sui was formerly under the jurisdiction of the native headman of Pao-ching, and Liu-li in it was also under the jurisdiction of Kan-chou. In the seventh year of Yung Cheng /1729/, the provincial governor Chao Hung-en and Wang Jou of Ch'en-yüan-ching tao pacified the uncivilized Miao at Liu-li and established a city at Chi-to-p'ing, called Yung-sui. (1)

1. Feng-huang T'ing Chih,
Vol. 1.

C Ku-chang /hsien/ in the Ming period was the territory
[701] under the control of the three senior officials at Shin-tung-ch'i, Pe-ya-tung, and T'ien-chia-tung, under the jurisdiction of the military and civilian pacification commissioner's office at Yung-sui.

Pao-ching was formerly the territory under the control of the Pao-ching pacification commissioner.

M After the five hsien in the Miao frontier region were
[634] opened, from the Yuan and Ming dynasties to the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty, they were under the control of native headmen. During the K'ang Hsi reign period of the early Ch'ing /1662-1722/, a gradual change was begun from native headmen to regular government officials. In the forty-sixth year of K'ang Hsi /1707/, the senior official /ch'ang kuan szu/ at Wu-chai, T'ien Hung-t'ien, being harsh and cruel, the provincial governor, Chao Shen-ch'iao, sent up a memorial

/106 cont./

C 175 631 563 M *175 631 *648 [622] C [703] [701] [203] were established, subject to the jurisdiction of civil and military authorities. In the Miao villages, there were established only village chiefs to govern a unit of 100 families. However, since Chinese were also permitted to fill these posts, gradually there were rapacious, unscrupulous rogues, whose mistreatment caused disturbances. It is requested that from among the Miao who have submitted, and on whom were conferred the peacock feather decoration /for merit, in early Ch'ing times/, there be selected some intelligent, aware persons, to be appointed at each ying /military station/ as native second captain /shou-pei/, lieutenant /ch'ien-tsung/, and sergeant or corporal /wai-wei/, such positions to be filled through the governor-general and governor's /tu-wu/ yamen /tu-wu ya-men/ and to be subject to the control of the civil and military authorities. When the various t'ang hsin in the Miao area have official despatches to send, they can order the said native petty officers to select Miao to question and send, and also to give them some cash and rations. When officials traveling on official

C [357] business require servants, they may also recruit them from the Miao, and pay them wages according to the Chinese scales.

C 175 631 563 M *175 631 *648 622 It would appear that the 100-families village chief was originally inaugurated to discipline the Miao, but these men were unimportant and their powers limited, as that the Miao did not heed them. Moreover, among the Chinese holding such positions there were rapacious, unscrupulous rogues, whose mistreatment led to disturbances. This should naturally be explained, deliberated, and changed, so as to fix responsibility. During the recent campaign those submissive Miao who accompanied the army and won peacock feather awards are numerous, therefore from these select those who are intelligent and aware, and who have the support of the rest, and according to the customary set-up of t'u-kuan /officials governing aboriginal tribes in West China/, every Ying should have one or two men to be native second captains, under whom there should be native lieutenants and sergeants, for better control of

/107 cont./

C 175 631 563 M *175 631 *648 425 C M [701] C [651] the Miao were greatly impressed by the strength of the Imperial army and surrendered land previously forcefully occupied by them. Also it would seem that if there was property of refractory Miao; it was confiscated. The fields were distributed among the law-abiding Miao to plant and pay rent, so that a Miao army could be raised and supported. Now the usurped land surrendered in the various villages totals more than 30,100 mu, and the land confiscated from the property of the rebel Miao totals more than 5,040 mu. These are now being separately registered, distributed for tilling for rent, and the revenues derived therefrom should be able to support 5,000 Miao soldiers. Among the 9,900 native Miao soldiers discharged over time and remaining, those able to bring up a plan to make a living have been sent back to their villages, and those who are old, weak, and poor have been given fields to till. Now 5,000 strong and healthy Miao soldiers have been selected, 2,000 of whom come from Feng-huang sub-prefecture; 800, from Kan-chou sub-prefecture; 1,800 from Yung-sui sub-prefecture; 100, from Ku-chang-p'ing sub-prefecture; and 300, from Pao-ching hsien. To collect the grain given over as rent, the Miao petty officers have selected in the various villages spots for building granaries to store away the public grain. Two or three honest Miao officers are chosen for each granary to supervise receipts and disbursements of the grain. The said 35,000 mu of arable land is estimated to be capable of yielding more than 22,000 shih of seeds of grain. It is estimated that there remain in various Miao granaries about 40 shih of seeds of grain, which will be used to fill the need for rations for the Miao soldiers in the intercalary month. The Miao officers are still ordered to report the actual receipts of rent grain every year." (1)

C 651 175 631 563 M *175 631 *648 622

1. "Chün T'un" in Hunan Miao Fang T'un Ch'eng Kao /Study of the Administration of the Defense T'un of the Miao Area in Hunan/, Vol. 5, pp. 56-57.

M [113]

2:Ling & Ruey--156 E-5 (1933) 1947 AE5 Miao AE5
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/107 cont./

Miao Area in Hunan/,
Vol. 5, pp. 56-57.

Thus a Miao official was a military official having concurrent judicial and financial duties, whose power actually was equivalent to that of a t'u-szu /headman/. The only difference was that the position was not hereditary. As for the procedure of appointment, according to a reply from the Board of War in the twenty-eighth year of Tao Kuang /1848/, Miao Pei P'ieh Chi Ta /?/ Chang-ch'eng /Regulations concerning the Commissioning of Petty Officers of Miao Defense/, it is stated: "The 486 Miao officers in the five sub-prefectures and hsien of Ku-chang-p'ing, consisting of shou-pei, ch'ien-tsung, pa-tsung, and wai-wei, were recommended by the sub-prefectures and hsien to Ch'en-yüan tao for approval, and then commissioned with official seals by the governor-general, governor, and provincial commander-in-chief. According to the regulations for the promotion of Miao t'un officers, a pa-tsung is considered by the tao and then appointed by the Board; the wai-wei is appointed directly by the tao, and when the pa-tsung becomes due for promotion to ch'ien-tsung, his commission must be confirmed by the governor-general and governor, and when the ch'ien-tsung is promoted to shou-pei, his record must be examined by the commander-in-chief. Today, in the appointment of Miao petty officers, even wai-wei have to be commissioned by the governor-general and governor, hence there is a great deal of red tape involved. It is recommended that the Miao defense petty officers can be selected according to the regulations governing the t'un petty officers of the tao troups /piao, "banner"/. Hereafter the Miao wai-wei and pa-tsung are to be changed to be appointed by the tao, the Miao ch'ien-tsung to be appointed by the provincial governor with official seal, and the shou-pei to be appointed by the governor-general. The Board of War has found that the previous procedure of appointing Miao officials, through joint deliberation of the provincial governor-general, governor, and commander-in-chief is /108/ too involved,

C /108 cont./
175 and in order to simplify it the recommendations in the memorial
631 of the said governor-general should be followed." From this it
563 may be seen that in the beginning, the appointment of a Miao
701 official was regarded as a serious matter. A petty officer such
M as a wai wei had to be commissioned by the governor-general
*175 and governor.
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(2) The Organization of Miao Officials

With regard to the organization of Miao officials at that time, it differed somewhat in the five hsien and sub-prefectures of the Miao region. Feng-huang sub-prefecture had four ying /battalions/: the middle ying's two Miao shou-pei /second captains/, four ch'ien-tsung /lieutenants/, six pa-tsung /sergeants/, and 20 wai wei /corporals/ were in charge of 96 villagers, totaling 2,680 families, consisting of 6,230 men and 3,479 women. The left ying's two Miao shou-pei, three ch'ien-tsung, six pa-tsung, and 15 wai wei are in charge of 63 villages, totaling 2,387 families, consisting of 5,795 men and 4,673 women. The right ying's four Miao shou-pei, seven ch'ien-tsung, 13 pa-tsung, and eleven wai-wei were in charge of 179 villages, totaling 4,191 families, comprising 9,710 men and 6,090 women. The front ying's three shou-pei, six ch'ien-tsung, 12 pa-tsung, and 14 wai wei were in charge of 191 villages, totaling 3,985 families, comprising 8,466 men and 5,162 women. The above eleven shou-pei, 20 ch'ien-tsung, 37 pa-tsung, and 60 wai wei, totaling 128 Miao petty officers, were in charge of 529 villages, 13,243 families with 30,201 men and 19,404 women, a total population of 49,605. From the various families 2,000 Miao soldiers were chosen, 400 of them being soldiers receiving rations. (1)

M [162]

M [162]

1. Feng-huang T'ing Chih, Vol. 11.

M [162] Kan-ch'eng was also divided into four ying — the middle, left, right, and front yings. The middle ying's one Miao

/108 cont./
shou-pei, two ch'ien-tsung, three pa-tsung, and six wai-wei were in charge of 15 villages, with 425 families, comprising 981 men and women. The left ying's one Miao shou-pei, two ch'ien-tsung, four pa-tsung, and eight wai-wei were in charge of 86 villages, totaling 1,784 families with 5,992 men and women. The right ying's one Miao shou-pei, one ch'ien-tsung, four pa-tsung, and five wai-wei were in charge of 18 villages, with 701 families, comprising 1,095 men and women. The front ying's one Miao shou-pei, one ch'ien-tsung, two pa-tsung, /109/ and six wai-wei administered eleven villages, consisting of 430 families, with 993 men and women. The above four Miao shou-pei, six ch'ien-tsung, 13 pa-tsung, and 25 wai-wei, totaling 48 Miao petty officers, controlled 130 villages, 3,340 families with 7,061 men and women. Moreover, 800 Miao soldiers were recruited from the various families. (1)

1. Kan-chou T'ing Chih, Vol. 7.

In the organization at Yung-sui, they were known as li, not ying. The whole region was divided into 12 li, each li having one shou-pei. The Upper Fifth Li had one Miao shou-pei, one ch'ien-tsung, two pa-tsung, three wai-wei, 15 fighting soldiers /chan ping/, and 85 guard soldiers /shou ping/, controlling 840 families, with 4,192 men and women. The Lower Fifth Li had one Miao shou-pei, one ch'ien-tsung, two pa-tsung, six wai-wei, 15 fighting soldiers, and 129 guard soldiers, over 446 families with 1,440 men and women. The Upper Sixth Li had one Miao shou-pei, three ch'ien-tsung, four pa-tsung, nine wai-wei, 22 fighting soldiers, and 129 guard soldiers, over 992 families with 4,101 men and women. The Lower Sixth Li had one Miao shou-pei, two ch'ien-tsung, seven pa-tsung, nine wai-wei, 29 fighting soldiers, and 129 guard soldiers, in control of 1,307 families with 6,386 men and women. The Upper Seventh Li had one Miao shou-pei,

/109 cont./

three ch'ien-tsung, six pa-tsung, eight wai-wei, 61 fighting soldiers, and a guard force of 154, controlling an area of 726 families with 2,767 men and women. The Lower Seventh Li had one Miao shou-pei, three ch'ien-tsung, six pa-tsung, 12 wai-wei, 48 fighting soldiers, and a guard force of 133 men, governing 1,109 families with 4,313 men and women. The Upper Eighth Li had one Miao shou-pei, one ch'ien-tsung, no pa-tsung, four wai-wei, nine fighting soldiers, and 61 guard soldiers, governing 302 families with 1,298 men and women. The Lower Eighth Li had one Miao shou-pei, two ch'ien-tsung, five pa-tsung, seven wai-wei, 48 fighting men, and a guard force of 135 men, controlling 595 families with 1,650 men and women. The Upper Ninth Li /110/ had one Miao shou-pei, three ch'ien-tsung, eight pa-tsung, 14 wai-wei, 32 fighting men, and a guard force of 138 men, governing 2,337 families with 9,413 men and women. The Lower Ninth Li had one Miao shou-pei, three ch'ien-tsung, six pa-tsung, 14 wai-wei, 32 fighting men, and a guard force of 138 men, governing 1,480 families with 7,264 men and women. The Upper Tenth Li had one Miao shou-pei, three ch'ien-tsung, eight pa-tsung, 21 wai-wei, 19 fighting men, and a guard force of 131 men, governing 1,128 families with 4,529 men and women. The Lower Tenth Li had one Miao shou-pei, three ch'ien-tsung, five pa-tsung, ten wai-wei, 18 fighting soldiers, and a guard force of 82 men, governing 843 families with 3,600 men and women. The above 12 Miao shou-pei, 28 ch'ien-tsung, 57 pa-tsung, and 115 wai-wei were set up in the second year of Chia Ch'ing /1797/ when the 100-family system was abolished. These lower officials went back and forth, controlling the scattered Miao in the various li. The guard force of 1,800 men was set up in the tenth year /1805/ and its men were retained from the Miao soldiers of the disbanded t'u t'ang /?/. The 384 fighting men were appointed in 1805 and picked from among the guard soldiers. (1)

1. Yung-sui T'ing Chih, Vols. 6 and 15.

/110 cont./

C 175 631 563 701 M *175 631 *648 622 701 [162]

The fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth tu /subdivision of a hsien/ in Pao-ching each had a Miao shou-pei, nine ch'ien-tsung, 12 pa-tsung, 31 wai-wei, and 300 Miao soldiers. (2)

2. Pao-ching Hsien Chih, Vol. 5.

The Miao officials appointed at Ku-chang-p'ing included one shou-pei, two ch'ien-tsung, four pa-tsung, 12 wai-wei, and 100 Miao soldiers, controlling 58 Miao villages. (3)

3. Ku-chang-p'ing T'ing Chih, Vol. 2.

Regulations concerning Miao officials were set up in the second year of Chia Ch'ing (1797), and were still in existence when the authors were carrying out their investigations in the Miao area in 1933. The four yings — front, left, right, and middle — at Feng-huang have been made into eleven yings due to the presence of eleven shou-pei. The subdivisions of Pao-ching formerly called tu are now called ch'ü, but the structure remains the same.

C 631 563 701 [169] M 701 631 *648 622

Since the Miao rebellion during the Ch'ien Lung reign period /1736-95/, the authorities have prohibited Chinese from entering Miao country. Furthermore, since the Miao dreaded seeing Chinese officials, then the Miao shou-pei, ch'ien-tsung, pa-tsung, and wai-wei were set up with the responsibility of controlling the Miao. In cases when the Miao were involved in such affairs as fights or theft, these petty officers were charged with the responsibility of apprehending the offenders. For the official despatches to be sent it was necessary to rely on them to get the messengers, and the pressing for rents and grain were also under the Miao officials' control. Moreover, the Miao petty officials were asked to submit seasonal affidavits as to whether there were Chinese entering the Miao villages.

[Text continues on p165]

2:Ling & Ruey--161 E-5 (1933) 1947 AE5 Miao AE5
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The following table shows the results of our investigations: /111/

Hsien	Ying	Name of Native Head	Guard Station
Feng-huang	Upper Middle Ying	Lung Fu-shou	Mao-tu-t'ang
	Lower Middle Ying	Wu Tsung-ch'ing	Hsin-tung-p'ing
	Upper Left Ying	Wu Fang-ming	Pao-mu-ying
	Lower Left Ying	Wu Hsiu-ch'ing	San-kung-ch'iao
	Right Ying	Lung En-te	Ya-pao-chai
	Upper Right Ying	Lung Feng-wu	Lung-chüeh-tung
	Right Ying	Wu Shao-hai	Chuang-chi-chai
	Lower Right Ying	Lung Tsung-chieh	Ta-t'ien
	Upper Front Ying	Shih Chao-pin	Hsin-chai
	Middle Front Ying	Wu Ch'ing-te	T'ien-p'ing
	Lower Front Ying	Wu Cheng-ying	Ku-sang-ying
Total		11	
Kan-ch'eng	Middle Ying	Wu Chia-chu	San-ch'a-p'ing
	Left Ying	Yang Sheng-pao	Ch'ü-chia-chai
	Right Ying	Shih Yung-chi	Hsi-ch'üeh-chai
	Front Ying	Yang Tsai-chen	Meng /?/ Ch'e
Total		4	

/Upper left quarter/

CM 631 622 701

/111 cont./

Central China AF/4

/Lower left quarter/

Ku-chang	Lung-pi-tsui Ying /Dragon Snout Ying/	Lung Ch'ing-nung	Nung-pi-tsui
Total		1	
Pao-ching	Fourth Ch'ü	Wu Chung-ch'ing	Pe-ho-t'ien
	Sixth Ch'ü	Hung Yung-liang	Hu-lu-chai
	Seventh Ch'ü	Shih Ch'ing-sung	Pi-tzu-chai
	Eighth Ch'ü	Liang Kuang-yung	Shui-t'ien
Total		4	
/112/ Yung-sui	Upper Fifth Li	Lung Sheng-hsin	Tung-k'a-chai
	Lower Fifth Li	Shih Wei-hsin	Ch'ien-ch'ang-chai
	Upper Sixth Li	Shih Ming-yüan	Pan-li-chai
	Lower Sixth Li	Shih Tsung-huang	Chia-ming-chai
	Upper Seventh Li	Lung Ch'ang-yao	Chien-yen-chai
	Lower Seventh Li	Wu Ting-k'uei	La-wu-chai
	Upper Eighth Li	Wu Ch'eng-chang	Ta-pai-wu
	Lower Eighth Li	Lung Kuo-han	Ya-pao-chai
	Upper Ninth Li	Ma Ch'ang-shun	Pai-ta-k'ou
	Lower Ninth Li	Shih Tuan-ch'u	Wei-ch'eng-chai
	Upper Tenth Li	Shih Chin-yüan	Pai-pu-mei
	Lower Tenth	Wang Kuo-ch'ang	Pai-liao-chai
Total		12	
Grand Total		32	

2:Ling & Ruey--163 E-5 (1933) 1947 AE5 Miao AE5
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/112 cont./

/Upper right quarter/

Number of Petty Officers and Soldiers					Total Numbers		
Ch'en-tsung	Pa-tsung	Wai-wei	Fighting Soldiers	Guard Soldiers	Petty Officers	Soldiers	Total Ying Complement
2	4	8	30	150	14	180	194
2	3	9	30	140	14	170	184
2	4	6	30	190	12	220	232
1	3	8	80	200	12	280	292
2	5	9	55	152	16	207	223
2	2	6	54	114	10	168	178
2	4	6	43	136	12	179	191
1	2	4	58	91	7	149	156
2	5	10	17	182	17	199	216
1	3	5	2	65	9	67	76
3	5	9	1	180	17	181	198
20	40	80	400	1,600	140	2,000	2,140
2	2	6	48	157	10	205	215
2	7	10	40	191	19	231	250
2	4	3	40	154	9	194	203
		6	32	138	6	170	176
6	13	25	160	640	44	800	844

/112 cont./

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/Lower right quarter/

2	4	12		100	18	100	118
2	4	12		100	18	100	118
1	1	2	8	42	4	50	54
3	5	9	19	61	17	80	97
3	4	15	21	79	22	100	122
2	2	5	12	58	9	70	79
9	12	31	60	240	52	300	352
1	3	3	14	81	7	95	102
1	3	6	14	81	9	95	104
3	4	9	28	162	16	190	206
2	7	9	54	121	18	175	193
3	4	8	56	168	15	224	239
3	6	12	66	176	21	242	263
1		4	9	68	5	77	82
2	4	7	38	91	13	129	142
3	8	12	36	142	23	178	201
3	6	14	30	142	23	172	195
3	8	21	17	139	32	156	188
3	5	10	18	49	18	67	85
28	57	115	380	1,420	200	1,800	2,000
65	126	263	1,000	4,000	454	5,000	5,454

2:Ling & Ruey--165 E-5 (1933) 1947 AE5 Miao AE5
Central China AF14

/112 cont./

C 631 563 ● 701 M 631 622 *648 701 [177]

The policy of having Miao officials to govern the Miao has been in practice now for 140 years. At the time of the original separation of the execution and administrative functions between the Chinese and the Miao, the idea of Miao regulating the Miao could be said to have been aimed at the abuses of the time. But now after a hundred and some tens of years, the Miao have gradually been sinicized. Formerly, there was the difference between the civilized and uncivilized Miao, but today they have all become civilized. The policy of separate administration for the Miao and the Chinese has been informally discarded. Consequently, the regulations for Miao officials should be abolished. But, since the Republic, the Miao officials are still able to exist, largely because Chinese officials have been profiting by taking bribes for filling official posts. On the other hand, since the Miao officials get their positions through paying bribes, they go to great lengths to make extortions from the Miao people. The Miao people detest the Miao petty officials more than they do the Chinese officials. Moreover, today, the various hsien in the Miao area have been changed to the system of hsiang /villages/ and chen /towns/, each governed by a head, known as hsiang chang or chen chang, respectively. In view of this change, Miao officials have become superfluous. It is hoped that the authorities in the region will be able to do away with them soon.

/113/

CHAPTER SEVEN

C 175 563 669 M * 175 *648 C [712]

T'UN FIELDS

(1) Successive Changes in T'un Defense

Trouble with the Miao in western Hunan began in the Ming dynasty. But because of using an administrative policy of blockade against Miao country, the 270 years under the Ming

Central China AF14

C 175 563 669 712 M *175 *648

/113 cont./ did not witness serious trouble. The method of this blockade consisted of setting up stone guard posts /tiao-pao/, establishing guard stations /ying shao/, and building border walls, strictly demarcating the boundary between the Chinese and Miao areas, without allowing any infringement by one on the other. The section on government in the historical section of Miao Fang Pei Lan, recording the system of defense against the Miao during the Ming dynasty, has this to say: "During the fifth year of Hsüan Te /i.e. 1430/, the senior official /chang kuan/ at Kan-tzu-p'ing, Wu Pi-lang, and the Miao of Tung-jen, Kweichow, started a rebellion. The brigadier general /tsung ping kuan/, Hsiao Shou, built 24 guard posts /pao/ around the area to protect it. In the thirty-first year of Chia Ching /i.e. 1552/, the Miao in Hupeh-Hunan and Kweichow were pacified.

C 175 563 712

The Court sent Governor General Chang Yo to hold down Yüan-chou. Yo in consultation with Assistant Commissioner /fu shih/ Kao Hsien, and Lieutenant Colonel /ts'an chiang/ Sun Hsien drew up a plan to abolish the guard posts at Wan-chi. Then he built 12 outposts /shao/ called: Wu-chai, Yung-an, Ch'ing-ch'i, Ho-k'ou, Kan-tzu, Kan-chou, Ch'iang-hu, Shih-yang, Shao-p'o, Tung-hsin, Shui-t'ang-yao, Shui-t'ien-ying, which with that at Chen-ch'i-so came to 13 in all. Every guard station had a wall, a tower, a drill yard, a narrow gate, an office, and a community storehouse /she ts'ang/. The officer corps

C 175 563 ● 701

included a tu-pei /"head of senior soldiers"/, ling-pan /"section leader"/, ling-tui /"company leader"/, ling-cheng /"recruitment and arms officer?"/, kuan-piao /"keeper of banners"/, kuan-ts'ang /"keeper of the storehouse"/, and li-mu /"head constable and keeper of the jail"/. The local official had under him t'ou-mu /"headmen"/, she-jen /"official secretaries"/, shih-tzu /"readers"/, chien-pu /"strong walkers"/, ta-shou /?lit., "move the hands"/ hsiang-t'u /?lit., geographers"/, po-k'ai /heralds/, and the Ch'i Miao soldiers. In all the officers and men totaled 6,000 or more, commanded by a lieutenant colonel /ts'an-chiang piao ying/, with a second

M 701

/113 cont./

C captain /shou-pei/ assisting him. Moreover, at the two mili-
175 tary stations /wei/ of Ch'en and Yüan, the frontier guard officers
563 and men, amounted to 6,600 or more, and the annual disburse-
701 ment to the Yüan-chou treasury for paying the troops was more
M than 30,089 /sic/ liang of silver, that to the Ma-yang, Ch'ien-
[701] yang, and Kan-chou military rations granaries and the autumn government rations at Chen-ch'i-so were 31,890 or more. At this time, the lieutenant colonel /tsan-chiang Tu-ling/ directed matters at the top, the majors /yu-chi/ and second captains /shou-pei/ attended to things at the middle level, and the guard stations /ying-shao/ carried out defense duties at the lower level. Furthermore, fearing the difficulty of communications in times of trouble, it was arranged for the sake of convenience as follows: 'For operations involving under 3,000 men, decisions may be made on the spot, but for operations involving more than 3,000 men, the decision must be made after consultation with the military defense officials. As the number of soldiers increased and generals became more strong, the border regions became more quiet and peaceful. In the
C forty-third year Wan Li /i.e. 1615/, the Military Defense Ts'an
175 Cheng, Ts'ai Fu-i, because the guard stations being spread out
563 and the Miao roads rugged, it was difficult to prevent spying,
712 applied for an appropriation of 40,000 or more gold for the
M construction of a frontier earth wall, starting from T'ung-jen
* 648 and going down to Pao-ching guard station, along mountains
*175 and extending in all more than 300 li, so that frontier defense
C could be made somewhat more /114/ secure. In the second
[634] year of T'ien Ch'i /i.e. 1622/, a provincial governor was set up at P'ien-yüan.... The then pei tao fu shih /assistant commissioner of defense?/ Hu I-hung at Ch'en Yüan despatched Major Teng Tsu-yü from Chen-ch'i-so to Hsi-ch'üeh-ying to build an additional 60 more li of frontier wall." (1)

1. Miao Fang Pei Lan, Vol. 15.

/114 cont./

During the Ts'ung Cheng reign period /1628/ /the end of the Ming dynasty/, the Miao rebelled, demolishing the guard stations and leveling the border wall. The "Great Wall" to blockade Miao country disappeared. The 7,800 guard troops /shou ping/ in the Miao area of the Ming dynasty were reduced to 1,600 men at the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty. When the rebellion of Wu San-kwei was pacified and all was peaceful again, there was another reduction of 500 men, leaving 1,100 men. Military strengh was slight and the defense system was relaxed. Further, following the change from native headmen to Chinese officials, and the use of Chinese as the head of every hundred families, intercourse between the Chinese and the Miao was no longer prohibited. In the twenty-ninth year of Ch'ien Lung /i.e. 1764/, in view of the Miao having undergone acculturation for a long time, they were allowed to intermarry with the Chinese. The original idea was to change the Miao by teaching, but with the passing of time evils developed, when rapacious Chinese under the pretext of trade entered the Miao area and seduced crafty Miao to enter into thievery. Unlike soldiers they entered Miao country for personal reasons and mistreated the Miao. The Miao made a pretext of these guest men's exploitations and encroachments on their land and banded together to make trouble, and brought about the great rebellion during the Ch'ien Lung /1736-95/ and Chia Ch'ing /1796-1820/ reign periods. After the rebellion was put down, the Manchu court realized that the time was yet inopportune to change the Miao by teaching, and the blockade policy was once more used. The various hsiens along the Miao border were heavily garrisoned for protection.

Cheng-kan-chen /Chen-kan Brigade/ was set up at Fenghuang, headed by a brigade general /tsung ping kuan/, controlling four ying /battalions/ —middle, right, front, and left, with three majors, one captain /tu-szu/, four second captains /shou-pei/, eight lieutenants /ch'ien-tsung/, 19 sergeants /pa-tsung/, 23 corporals /wai-wei/, 14 supernumeraries /e-wai/, and a total of 3,389 soldiers.

Central China

/114 cont./

C 175 563 701 M 701

Sui-ching-chen /Sui-ching Brigade/ was established at Hua-yüan, Yung-sui (today under Yung-sui hsien), where were stationed one brigade general, one major, one captain, two second captains, three lieutenants, six sergeants, nine corporals five supernumeraries, and a total of 1,440 soldiers, taking part in the defense of nine guard stations. At Yung-sui there was also set up the Yung-sui Hsieh with one assistant brigade general /fu-chiang/, one captain, two second captains, three lieutenant seven sergeants, eight corporals, eight supernumeraries, and 1,240 soldiers. They controlled seven outposts, under the direction of the Sui-ching Chen at Hua-yüan.

Kan-chow Hsieh was established in Kan-ch'eng with an assistant brigade general, one major, one captain, three second captains, two lieutenants, ten sergeants, nine corporals ten supernumeraries, and 1,400 soldiers, who defended 15 outposts under the direction of the provincial commander in chief /ti-tu/.

/115/ In Pao-ching there was set up one ying with one lieutenant colonel /tsan-chiang/, two second captains, two lieutenants, five sergeants, nine corporals, ten supernumeraries and 952 soldiers, defending 19 guard stations, subject to the direction of the Sui-ching Chen at Hua-yüan.

The Ku-chang-p'ing ying was established at Ku-chang, with a captain, two lieutenants, three sergeants, three corporal three supernumeraries, and in all 740 soldiers, stationed at the ying headquarters but defending the various military posts.

C 175 563 701 712 M * 175 * 648

At that time in addition to stationing heavy complements of soldiers in the Miao area, there were also put up a total of 1,121 stone guard houses /tiao ch'ia/ along the ruins of the wall left from the Ming dynasty. In addition to the stationing of government troops at important positions, there were more than 800 of these guard houses where 9,000 soldiers were left to protect the border. Later when the nation became short of money, it was not possible to maintain large forces in this deep interior area for defense. Thus, suddenly, the frontier guards were withdrawn, then the stone guard houses became empty, and there was fear that the fierce Miao would start a rebellion.

/115 cont./

000 empty, and there was fear that the fierce Miao would start a
C rebellion. At this time Fu Nai of Yüan-ch'en tao met with
175 Brigade General Fu Chih-na of Chen-kan Chen and summoned
563 together people of the sub-prefecture to discuss a long-range
701 plan. And so they began the t'un system of defense. Fields
651 were allotted to feed the fighters and to defend the guard houses
425 against the Miao. As for the people's /i.e. Chinese/ land,
except for fields for sustenance, a male could retain three tou
of grain, a woman one tou. As for the rest of the land seven
were allotted while three were retained, for one shih of grain
three tou was personally retained, and seven tou given up for
C allotment, to feed the fighters and guard the frontier. In the
[712] Feng-huang area there were more than 830 stone guard houses,
requiring 4,000 men to man them in rotation. Further, 1,000
men were trained to be combat ready. The more than 22,000
mu of land allotted were not enough to meet the expense, and
so another allotment of more than 12,300 mu at Lu-ch'i and
C Mo-yang was made. There were also 127 stone petty military
[712] stations /tiao pao/ at Kan-chou, manned by 800 soldiers,
supported by more than 2,170 mu of allotted land. The
original sect of government of Yung-sui, before the Miao
rebellion during the reign period of Ch'ien Lung and Chia Ch'ing,
was at Wei-ch'eng, which was entirely surrounded by the Miao.
In the second year of Chia Ch'ing /1797/, the seat of govern-
C ment was moved to Hua-yüan with a newly built yamen.
[712] There were 126 stone guard houses with 2,000 soldiers. The
people's land, i.e. Chinese land, usurped by rebels and re-
covered for public use, totaled more than 17,110 mu. There
were over 70 stone military stations /tiao pao/, at Pao-ching,
with 300 soldiers and over 2,170 mu of allotted land. There
were only 18 stone guard houses at Ku-chang-p'ing with a
hundred soldiers and over 120 mu of allotted land.

M The above refers to Chinese t'un /min t'un/. In addition,
*[175] there were also Miao t'un. After the suppression of the Miao
*[648] rebellion, the Miao tribes, awed by military might, surrendered
[651] all the Chinese land formerly forcefully usurped by them, and
[727]
[425]

C
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*648
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/115 cont./ also searched into the properties of the rebel Miao and decided to return them for public use. The forcefully usurped land totaling over 30,100 mu and the rebels' properties totaling over 5,400 mu were redistributed among the law-abiding Miao to farm. Granaries were built to collect rent /tsu/ for the maintenance of Miao soldiers. The pressing for rent, the inspecting of fields, the distribution and transportation of grain, and other duties were all the responsibility of Miao officials.

/116/ The total amount of Chinese land and Miao land given up for allotment in the seven sub-prefectures and hsiens of the Miao area was as follows: (1)

1. Hunan Miao Fang T'un Ch'eng K'ao, Chapter 7, "Chün T'un San," "Chün T'un T'ien Tu Ts'ung Shu" /"The Total Amount of Allotted T'un Land," in "Allotted T'un," 3/," numbers set after the subduing of the Miao in 1797.

1. Feng-huang Sub-prefecture
   (1) Allotted fields 22,080.6 mu (allotted in the fifth year of Chia Ch'ing /1800/).
   (2) Fields returned to public use 3,539 mu (Chinese fields usurped by the Miao but surrendered when called on and returned for public use).
   (3) Fields redeemed by the government 5,587.3 mu. (Chinese fields granted to the Miao at a low pledge but redeemed by the government for public use).
   (4) Fields usurped by the rebels surrendered by the Miao 7,650.8 mu (Miao rebels' property, wrongfully farmed by them, surrendered to the government for public use).
   (5) Usurped rebel land returned by the Miao 5,983.7 mu (same as above).

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C 175/118 cont./ 651 563 M *175 *648 651

by Yü Fan-ch'uan: "The decision of the first conference on t'un matters held in the twenty-fifth year of the Republic /1936/ was to reduce the rental on devastated land 1,592 shih, 3 tou, 8 sheng, 8 ho. Currently, the actual receipt of rent is 65,416 shih, 1 tou, 2 sheng." (1)

1. Pien Chiang /Frontier/, Vol. 2, no. 2.

(2) The Organization of T'un Defense

C 175 [701] M [701]

1. The organization of the t'un defense /system/ during the early Ch'ing dynasty.

(1) Feng-huang Sub-prefecture. T'un second captains 3, t'un lieutenants 4, t'un sergeants 4, t'un corporals 10, supernumeraries 9, Miao second captains 11, Miao lieutenants 20, Miao sergeants 40, Miao corporals 80, general t'un leaders /tsung t'un chang/ 15, special t'un leaders /san t'un chang/ 60, home guard /lien yung/ 1,000, old and young males 1,000, able-bodied t'un males /t'un ting/ 4,000, Miao soldiers 1,000, t'un camps 27, Miao camps 25, stone houses 544, t'un guard houses 105, guard stations 51, patrol stations 98, canon emplacements 7, gates 24, gate houses 5. The above stone houses, guard houses, guard stations, patrol stations, gun emplacements, gates, and gate houses totaled 834 units. There were 63 t'un and Miao granaries, and the fixed rent was 25,461 shih, 3 tou, 9 sheng, 6 ho, 8 shuo. Shotguns numbered 7,022, swords 300, spears 100, and hand guns /shou p'ao/ 40. The above guns, swords, and spears amounted to 16,229 weapons.

C [712] C [651] C [713]

C [701] M [701] C [712]

(2) Kan-chou Sub-prefecture. T'un second captain 1, t'un sergeant 1, t'un corporals 2, t'un supernumeraries 2, Miao second captains 4, Miao lieutenants 6, Miao sergeants 13, Miao corporals 13, Miao corporals 25, general t'un leaders 4, special t'un leaders 21, able-bodied t'un males 600, Miao soldiers 800, t'un camps 8, Miao camps 10, stone houses 75,

C 175 [712] /119 cont./ t'un guard houses 13, guard stations 28, gun emplacements 4, gates 5, gate houses 2. The above stone houses, guard houses, guard stations, patrol posts, gun emplacements, gates, and gate houses totaled 128 units. There were 11 t'un and Miao granaries, and the set rent was 7,725 shih, 1 tou, 3 sheng, 2 ho, 9 shuo. Shotguns were 3,244, hand guns 10, swords 100, spears 395. The above weapons totaled 5,841 weapons.

C [701] M [701] C [712] C [651] [713] (3) Yung-sui Sub-prefecture. T'un second captains 2, t'un lieutenants 2, t'un sergeants 3, t'un corporals /120/ 3, t'un supernumeraries 3, Miao second captains 12, Miao lieutenants 28, Miao sergeants 57, Miao corporals 115, general t'un leaders 12, special t'un leaders 33, t'un males 2,000, old and young males 800, Miao soldiers 1,800, t'un camps 13, Miao camps 19, stone houses 67, t'un guard houses 20, guard stations 29, gates 8, gate houses 3. The above stone houses, guard houses, guard stations, gates, and gate houses totaled 127. There were 21 t'un and Miao granaries, and the set rent was 29,756 shih, 6 tou, 4 sheng, 8 ho, 8 shuo, 3 ch'ao. There were 4,915 shotguns, 190 swords, 3,295 spears, totaling 14,300 weapons.

C [701] M [701] C [712] C [651] [713] (4) Ku-chang-p'ing Sub-prefecture. T'un sergeant 1, t'un supernumerary 1, Miao second captain 1, Miao lieutenant 2, Miao sergeant 4, Miao corporal 12, general t'un leader 1, special t'un leaders 4, t'un males 100, Miao soldiers 100, Miao camps 4, stone houses 15, guard stations 4. The above stone houses, guard houses, and guard stations totaled 19. There were 3 t'un and Miao granaries, with a set rent of 523 shih, 7 tou, 1 sheng, 3 ho, 5 shuo, 3 ch'ao. There were 655 shotguns, 369 swords, and 368 spears, totaling 1,828 weapons.

C [712] [651] [713] [701] M [701] (5) Pao-ching Hsien. T'un corporals 2, t'un supernumeraries 2, Miao second captains 4, Miao lieutenants 9, Miao sergeants 12, Miao corporals 31, general t'un leaders 3, special t'un leaders 12, t'un males 300, Miao soldiers 300, t'un camps 2, Miao camps 12, stone houses 30, t'un guard houses 30, guard stations 25, gate 1, gate house 1. The stone houses,

C [712]

C /120 cont./
175 guard houses, guard stations, gate, and gate houses totaled 70.
712 There were 9 t'un and Miao granaries, the set rent was 4,023
651 shih, 1 tou, 1 sheng, 4 ho, 2 shuo. There were 552 shotguns,
[713] 684 swords, and 844 spears, totaling 2,938 weapons.

C (6) Mo-yang Hsien. General t'un leaders 2, special t'un
[701] leaders 10; t'un granaries 11, set rent 7,323 shih, 7 tou, 5 sheng, 5 ho, 8 shuo, 5 ch'ao.

(7) Lu-ch'i Hsien. General t'un leaders 3, special t'un leaders 20, t'un granaries 13, set rent 4,414 shih, 6 ton, 1 sheng, 8 ho, 9 ch'ao.

C /121/ The above seven sub-prefectures and hsiens had a
175 total of 56 t'un officers, 486 Miao officers, 200 t'un leaders,
[701] 1,000 home guards, 7,000 t'un males, 1,800 old and young
M males, and 5,000 Miao soldiers. There were 120 t'un and
[701] Miao camps, 731 stone houses, 151 t'un guard houses, 137
C guard stations, 99 patrol posts, 11 gun emplacements, 38 gates,
[712] and 11 gate houses. The above stone houses, guard houses,
C guard stations, patrol posts, gun emplacements, gates, and gate
[65] houses totaled 1,178. There were altogether 131 t'un and
[713] Miao granaries; the set rent was 79,218 shih, 3 tou, 9 sheng. There were in all 16,388 shotguns, 50 hand guns, 1,643 swords, and 5,002 spears, totaling 41,136 weapons.

C 2. Regulations for the organization and administration
701 of the T'un Bureau from the headquarters of the newly organized Thirty-Fourth Division of the Army.

Article 1. The said Bureau is to be organized on the order of Divisional Commander Ch'en of the newly organized Thirty-Fourth Division.

Article 2. The said Bureau shall set up, according to the temporary organization regulations of the Division, a chief and a deputy chief, three department heads, a number of departmental staff, clerks, and copyists.

Article 3. The chief of the Bureau will receive orders from the Commander of the Division, and will have general superintendence over the t'un army west of the Hsiang River,
C and Miao defense officials and soldiers, t'un grain supplies,
[563]

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/121 cont./

and the keeping in order of t'un properties, and coordinate 701 everything, with the authority to direct and supervise all the Bureau's personnel.

Article 4. The said Bureau shall have three departments, Departments One, Two, and Three. Each department head shall receive his orders from the chief of the Bureau, to assist him by dividing control over military matters, t'un matters, and general matters, with the responsibility to direct and manage his particular department's responsibilities.

Article 5. Department One will be responsible for:

(1) Matters pertaining to the regulation of the t'un army, training, direction, and deployment.

(2) Matters pertaining to the military equipment of this army, inventory and replenishment.

[563] (3) Deciding on all educational planning for the t'un army.

(4) Military plans for defense in the Miao area.

(5) Matters pertaining to active support and recruiting of supplies in the rear during wartime.

Article 6. Department Two will be responsible for:

(1) Matters pertaining to investigation and management of t'un grain in the seven hsiens, Feng-huang, Kan-chou, Yung-sui, Ku-chang-p'ing, Pao-ching, Lu-ch'i, and Mo-yang.

/122/(2) Plans relating to the collection, disbursement, and transportation of t'un rent /grain/ in each hsien.

Article 7. Department Three will be responsible for:

(1) Matters pertaining to the investigation of the civilian and military personnel.

(2) Attending to the records of cases of opium suppression within the whole defense area of the Division.

(3) Attending to matters not belonging to the other two departments.

Article 8. The members of a department will receive orders from the chief of the Bureau, and, under the supervision of the chief of the department, will attend to the various matters of the department.

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Article 9. The secretary of the Bureau will receive his
701 orders from the chief of the Bureau, and will attend to such matters as the writing of official despatches of the Bureau, the keeping of the archives, and directing the copying of documents.

Article 10. The clerks will receive orders from the chief of the Bureau, and, under the direction of the department head, will assist in carrying out the various duties of the department.

Article 11. The copyists will receive their orders from the chief of the Bureau and the departmental heads, and, under the direction of department members and the secretary, shall be responsible for copying despatches and telegrams.

Article 12. The system of documentary procedure of the Bureau is as follows:

Official on duty for the day → (makes extracts) receives and sends out (registers) → distributes to { Dept. 1, Dept. 2, Dept. 3, Secretariat }

makes main drafts → checks drafts → official on duty (distributes for copying)

submits for signature → seals and sends out → files in the archives

/122 cont./

Article 13. Because of the real necessity of its business, the Bureau shall maintain three officials on duty (a member of a department, a clerk, and a copyist), whose duties shall be as follows: • 701

(1) To keep a record of the items of business transacted during the day.

(2) To keep an attendence record of the personnel as a basis for reward and punishment.

(3) To attend to emergencies by taking discretionary measures and to report such measures to their superiors.

Article 14. Request for leave of absence for personal reasons must be requested and approved, otherwise such absences shall be considered negligence of duty.

Article 15. These regulations may be amended when the need arises by sending in a request.

/123/ Article 16. These regulations become effective on the day when they are approved by the divisional commander and made public.

CHART SHOWING THE SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION OF THE T'UN BUREAU OF THE NEWLY ORGANIZED 34TH DIVISION OF THE ARMY



Bureau of T'un Administration set up in 1933.

2:Ling & Rucy--181 E-5 (1933) 1947 AE5 Miao
/123 cont./
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701

/123 cont./

C 701 425 651 The t'un fields in the Miao frontier were divided into people's /i.e. Chinese/ t'uns and Miao t'uns, the two being entirely different in nature. The t'un males working on the Chinese t'uns were also divided into t'un men and fighting men. The t'un men received fields to cultivate, and guarded the t'un guard houses. The fighting men, also called home guards, were solely trained for military operations, and did not farm. In the five sub-prefectures and hsiens of the Miao frontier there are 7,000 t'un men, from among whom are appointed hsiao-ch'i, tsung-ch'i, and pe-tsung to facilitate control. The distribution of fields was as follows: the men /san ting/ are each given 4.5 mu; the hsiao-ch'i, 5.5 mu; the tsung-ch'i, 6.5 mu; and the pe-tsung, 7.5 mu. There are 1,000 fighting men, each being given 3 shih, 6 tou of rice per year. The non-fighting men are also each given annually 10.8 liang of silver for salt and vegetables. The hsiao-ch'i receives each year 12 liang of silver; the tsung-ch'i, 13.2 liang of silver; the pe-tsung, 16.8 liang of silver. Therefore, in the Chinese t'un, the fields and land left over after the t'un men have received their fields to plant and care for are leased out for the collection of rent. Granaries (Illus. 57) have been built to store the grain, and general t'un leaders are set up to manage these matters. There

C 701 425 651 563 M 701 648 [425] 177 are no t'un men in the Miao t'uns, and the t'un fields are allotted to people to cultivate /Illus. 57 and 58 on pages 124 and 125/ /126/ for the collection of rent, in order to feed the Miao soldiers, under the control of the Miao officials. The t'un fields in the Miao frontier region, at the inception of the system, totaled 150,000 mu of arable land, of which barely a third was directly cultivated by t'un personnel, the rest being allotted out as rented fields. Today, the t'un army in the Miao frontier region is about 1,000 strong. The maintainance of the Black Flag Battalion of the Miao troops (Illus. 58) largely comes from the rented fields. T'un fields were set up to support troops on the spot as a defense against the Miao. Today, the Miao have been largely acculturated by the Chinese and the boundary line between the Miao and the Chinese is gradually becoming obliterated. [text continues on p 185]

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

Illus. 58. The Black Flag Battalion of the Miao troops drilled by the Newly Organized 34th Division of the Army.